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THE VITAL PRINCIPLE OF PAUL JOSEPH BARTHEZ:
THE CLASH BETWEEN MONISM AND DUALISM*
by
ELIZABETH L. HAIGH**
IN TE history of eighteenth-century medicine, the name of the Medical University
of Montpellier is practically synonymous with the theory of vitalism. In its most
general sense, vitalism assumes that the study of organic phenomena cannot be re-
duced to a branch ofphysics or chemistry. It affirms that the living body possesses
some unique entity, a soul, force, faculty or principle which causes it to transcend
the realm of inert matter. Such a view of living matter was introduced into Mont-
pellier in the 1730s, a time when the prevailing tendency among medical theorists
was to view a livingbody as a complex mechanism. Forthe remainder ofthe century,
the teachers atthatschool allseem to have taughtthatlife and non-life are absolutely
separate categories of nature which must be studied with different tools.
The most influential Montpellier vitalist of all was Paul Joseph Barthez (1734-
1806) who elaborated his theory in the Nouveaux Elements de la science de l'homme,
a two-volume work first published in 1778. In it, he attributed the functions of a
living body to the action ofa force which he referred to simply as the vital principle
(leprincipe vitale). He considered that it coexists in the body with the rational soul.
The role ofthe latter is limited to overseeing that small proportion ofbody activity
which is due to the will and which is conscious. The vitalprinciple, on the otherhand,
governs those functions which had traditionally been assigned to the vegetative or
lowest soul in the Galenic system. Though Barthez was never able to decide whether
the vital principle was material or immaterial substance, he thought that all the evi-
dence pointed to its existence separate from the matter ofthe body itself. Nouveaux
eJlments was devoted to examination of the nature and the functions of the vital
principle.
The theory of the vital principle was a departure from the type ofvitalism which
had been evolving particularly among Barthez' older contemporaries at Montpellier.
Many of the school's teachers and former students had contributed to the develop-
ment of a theory concerning the vital role ofthe force ofsensibility. That name was
conferred upon a force or principle which was considered to be inherent in and
inseparablefromtheverysubstance oflivingmatter. Suchatheorymadelivingmotion
a function of the body itself and not the consequence of some force or substance
separate from itandpossessing adifferent nature. Bythe second halfofthe eighteenth
century, various forms ofthe theory ofsensibility were gaining prestigious adherents
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among physicians and medical theorists. It seemed to be confirmed by a wealth of
experimental evidence and, in many respects, it was narrowing the theoretical gap
which divided mechanists from the animists in the first part ofthe eighteenth century.
Though Barthez knew welltheworkdonein support ofthethesis thatlife is immanent
in the body, he rejected it. It is probable, he wrote, that the vital principle is not
part of the matter of the body though it controls it throughout the span of its life.
As long as it remains attached in some way, Barthezthoughtthatthe organismcarries
out its functions. It was this notion that the source of motion in a body is outside
the matter ofthat body which put Barthez outside the mainstream of French vitalist
thought in the decade of the 1770s when his major work was composed.
Barthez received his medical degree from Montpellier in 1753. In 1761 he was
awarded a Chair of Medicine at that institution. The school served him and his
ambitions very well. In time he achieved considerable prestige as a physician and
medical theorist. In Montpellier itself, his reputation has not been surpassed to this
day.' In the eighteenth century, his theory oflife and the vital principlecommended
itselfto his colleagues and guided the work ofsuchfamous physicians as Jean Charles
Grimaud and Charles Louis Dumas. Today, almost two centuries later, every physi-
cian and medical student at that school is still occasionally reminded ofhis contribu-
tion to medical theory and of the way it directed that university.
This paper will briefly examine the theoretical context in which vitalist notions
including Barthez' theory of the vital principle were developed. It will also consider
reasons why Barthez chose a theory which diverged in some significant ways from
the theories of his contemporaries with respect to the question of the nature of life.
I hope that it will suggest some reasons why his theory exerted such a powerful
influence on his students and successors at Montpellier.
I
At the beginning ofthe eighteenth century, speculation concerning thefundamental
nature of life owed a considerable debt to seventeenth-century physical science. In
particular, Newton's immensely successful work in the field ofphysics and astronomy
had dramatically demonstrated that henceforth the physical sciences were firmly
rooted in a sound theoretical and methodological foundation. Understandably every
student ofthe life sciences dreamed ofachieving a similar coherence in his discipline.
That impulse gave birth to theoretical systems which sought to unify the data of
physiology and anatomy. It is logical that in their search for a direction, physicians
and physiologists would turn to what appeared to be the more successful disciplines
1 Forexample, onehistorian from Montpellierrecently wrote that "Toutes les accusations port6es
plus tard contre le vitalisme de Barthez sont fausses. Ceux qui les ont avanc6es l'ont m6connu."
M. Gaston Giraud, 'Le probleme de la vie', Languedoc mnd., 1967, 50: 3-46. In a biographical
article, another author wrote that "Aujourd'hui, personne ne conteste plus i Montpellier que Paul
Joseph Barthez ait ete une des plus grandes figures de l'tcole, bien que son renom soit aussi efficace
a l'etranger ... les idees essentielles qu'il a 6mis6s sont devenues aujourd'hui tellement 6videntes
qu'elles ne sont plus contest6es par personne. Seule I'histoire de la m6decine est l pour rappeler
qu'il n'en fut pas toujours ainsi. La gloire personneile de Barthez y perd certainement, mais la
triomphe de ses id6es, n'est-ce pas l'essentiel?" Louis Dulieu, 'Paul Joseph Barthez', Rev. Hwt. Sci.
Applic., 1971, 24: 149-176.
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for guidance. Thus it was that very many iatromathematical and iatromechanical
works appeared in the latter part ofthe seventeenth century. The work of Giovanni
Borelli on animal motion, that of Georgius Baglivi on muscle fibres and that of
Lorenzo Bellini on kidney structure and function are only a few examples of many
works which attempted to understand living functions in terms of physical and
mathematical principles. In every case, the underlying assumption was that the physi-
cal body is a complex mechanism which operates in accordance with the laws of
matter and motion. It was assumed that willed and conscious activity derive from a
rational, immaterial principle located in the brain or the soul. For at least the first
third of the eighteenth century, the medical scene was dominated by Herman Boer-
haave (1668-1738) of Leiden University, the most famous mechanist theorist of all.
His European reputation as a theorist, teacher and physician was unsurpassed in his
lifetime and his physiological system came to be a largely undisputed guide in all
medical schools. The mechanists as a whole contributed substantially to the advance-
ment ofphysiology. Nevertheless their particular mechanical philosophy did not go
unchallenged for long.
At the same time that Boerhaave was enjoying his success and fame, Georg Ernst
Stahl (1659-1734) was paving the way for a complete revision of the fundamental
principles of biological thought. In a series of works written largely between 1706
and 1708, while he was on the medical faculty of the University of Halle, Stahl
enunciated an animist theory of life. That is, he argued that all the functions of a
body, unwilled as well as willed, unconscious as well as conscious, are the result of
the activity of a soul or anima.2 He intended his arguments to serve as adefiant illus-
tration ofthe limitations and errors ofthe prevailing mechanist theory and its animal
clock-work. Life, he wrote, is "the conservation of an eminently corruptible body,
the faculty or force withwhose aid the body is sheltered from the act ofcorruption."3
The body is corruptible because it is an unstable, heterogeneous mixture ofelements.
"If a mixture, an ordinary chemical composite, is homogeneous and stable, a living
body is naturally heterogeneous and condemned to corruption if it is abandoned to
itself."' It is this very heterogeneity which accounts for the great variety and com-
plexity ofliving creatures. It is at the basis ofall life-related functions for it enables a
living organism to perform such goal-directed and integrated activities as motion,
nutrition, adaptation and growth. The immaterial, rational and spiritual soul exists
in a situation of mutual dependence with the material body. "The soul cannot,
indeed, have any sensation of a thing, and consequently any thought or knowledge
' A thorough discussion of Stahl's physiological theory is to be found in an article by Francois
Duchesneau, 'G. E. Stahl: antim6canisme et physiologie', Archs. Int. Hist. Sci., 1976, (in press). See
also Lelland J. Rather, 'G. E. Stahl's psychological physiology'. Bull. Hist. Med., 1961, 53: 37-49.
Stahl's theory is discussed in the context of many larger works including Jacques Roger's, Les
sciences de la vie dans lapens6efrancaise du XVIIIe siecle, Paris, A. Colin, 1963, pp. 427-431; and
Roger K. French's, Robert Whytt, the soul and medicine, London, Wellcome Institute for the History
of Medicine, 1969, pp. 117-148. Also relevant to this paper is Lester S. King's, 'Basic concepts of
18th century animism', Amer. J. Psychiat., 1967, 124: 105-110.
' Georg Ernst Stahl, Vrai theorie medicale in Oeuvres mtdico-philosophiques et pratiques, ed. by
Th6odore Blondin, 6 vols., Paris, J. B. Bailliere, 1860, vol. 3, p. 43.
'Georg Ernst Stahl, Mixte et vivante, ibid., vol. 2, pp. 366-376.
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with regard to a sensible present object without the intermediary of sensory organs;
it cannot furthermore effect an act or execute its will without the aid of corporeal
organs." In turn, without the soul, the body ceases to live and decomposes.5 The
connexion between the material and immaterial was always a problem for those
persons who believed in their relationship in one body. Like most proponents ofsuch
an idea, Stahl's discussion ofthe question was less than adequate.
Mechanists and animists alike considered themselves to be separated by a consider-
abletheoretical gulf. Theirdifferences ofapproachto the organism andtheiremphasis
on different types of functions are undeniable. Both groups, however, adhered to
the basic assumptions of physiological dualism. Like Rene Descartes who first
articulated the most complete form of the body and soul, material and immaterial
dualism in his Discourse on Method, Boerhaave and Stahl both considered the matter
ofthe body to bepassive material which requires the action ofsome external force to
move it. The dualism is, of course, particularly clear in the case of Stahl and the
animists.
In the 1730s, a form ofStahlian theory was introduced to Montpellier by Francois
Boissier de Sauvages (1706-1767). His animist notions were initially supposed to
have created an uproar because, like most other European medical schools, Mont-
pellier had a mechanist orientation. In time however, antimechanist arguments
prevailed and took firm root there.6
The vitalists who succeeded the animists in Montpellier and elsewhere consistently
acknowledged that Stahl's anti-mechanist arguments were sound. But as eighteenth-
century physicians attempted to fit progressively more numerous observations into
some theoretical framework, the inadequacy ofboth mechanism and vitalism became
apparent. Both ofthe traditional dualist systems were unsatisfactory and needed to
be replaced. One of Sauvages' students, Th6ophile de Bordeu (1722-1776), made a
particularly significant contribution to vitalist theory. His medical philosophy was
most clearly and completely argued in a 1752 work entitled Recherches anatomiques
sur laposition desglandes et leur actions. Like the mechanists he restricted the role of
the soul to directing those actions which are conscious and willed. Most ofthe actions
of a living body are not among them and he assigned those to a government by a
force he called sensibility. Bordeu thought that vital function belonged to each organ
so that it was not imposed from outside by a soul or other force separate from the
body. His investigation of glands demonstrated the inadequacy of the mechanists'
theories about this activity in terms of pore size, blood velocity, the relationships
between different vessels and so on. He went on to account for glandular activity
and all other vital functions in terms ofa specific force ofsensibility residing in each
organ and a general sensibility directing the whole body.7 So vital motion came to
beviewed astheresult ofadistinctprincipleinseparable fromthematerialofthebody.
' Stahl, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 46-48. The same idea is expressed in Georg Ernst Stahl,
Micanisme et organisme, vol. 2, pp. 219-226.
A recent biographical study is by Louis Dulieu, 'Fran9ois Boissier de Sauvages (1706-1767)',
Rev. Hist. Sci. ApplIc., 1969, 22: 303-322. Also see Lester S. King, 'Boissier de Sauvages and 18th
century nosology', Bull. Hist. Med., 1966, 40: 43-51.
7 Elizabeth L. Haigh, 'Vitalism, the soul and sensibility: the physiology of Th6ophile Bordeu',
J. Hist. Med., 1976, 31:
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Bordeu acknowledged that his ideas on sensibility owed something to the work of
Jean Baptiste Van Helmont (1577-1644) and Francis Glisson (1598-1677). In fact,
Bordeu's theory is the product ofa marriage between vitalist convictions and monist
assumptions implicit in the work ofthe two men. At the beginning ofthe seventeenth
century, about the time that Descartes determined that human life was constituted of
an intricate mechanism and an immaterial soul, Van Helmont conceived of the
life of a substance as being immanent in that same substance. In a living body, he
wrote, there is a seminal principle or archeus which constructs the body and directs
its activity through a multitude of subsidiary archei.8 An immortal and spiritual
soul, Van Helmont wrote, governs consciousness and intellect as well as imagination,
judgement and memory, and it is centred in the brain.' The significant point here is
that the archeiwhich oversee most ofthe functions oflife were seen to be an integral
part of the body which experiences that life. Van Helmont's writing is a kind of
verbal labyrinth of magical, alchemical and astrological imagery. Nevertheless, it
was seriously studied by physicians after him and certainly it impressed Bordeu.
Where Van Helmont had written aboutarcheiunder the direction ofa grand archeus,
Bordeu described a force of sensibility in each organ under the direction of a
generalized sensibility. When the earlier system is stripped of its archaic language,
the physiological base is seen to be a monist view ofliving matter.10
In a 1768 work entitled Tractatus de ventriculo et intestinis, Glisson argued that
the basic functional unit of an organism is the fibre. Muscle tissues, tendons, nerves
and organs are allconstructed oftheseelemental fibres. The fibre possesses aproperty
of irritability (irritabilitas) which is an ability to contract in response to some kind
of stimulus and then to relax. The complete process of irritability consists of three
stages. Perception(perceptio) represents thefibre's reception ofa stimulus orimpulse;
itawakens adesire (appetitus) onthepart ofthefibre to react to aparticular stimulus;
finally motion (motus) is the execution ofthe required action.
According to Glisson, the vast majority ofthe functions ofthe body are governed
byabasicandevenprimitiveformofperceptionwhichhelabelled anaturalperception
(perceptio naturalis). Occurring independently ofthe will, the consciousness and even
the nervous system, it is entirely the product of the fibre and its organization. In
addition, there is a sensual perception which is conscious and an animal perception
which is conscious, deliberate and under the control of the will.11 A spiritual, im-
material soul conferred consciousness, will and rationality but not life itself.
' Jean Baptiste Van Helmont, 'The chief or master-workman', Orlatrike orphysick refined, trans.
by J. C. Sometime, London, Lodorvick Loyd, 1662, pp. 35-36.
' Jean Baptiste Van Helmont, 'The seat ofthe soul', ibid., pp. 192-197.
I' The argument that Van Helmont's theory is a monist one is put forward by Walter Pagel in
'`Te reaction to Aristotle in seventeenth century biological thought', Science, medicine and history,
ed. by E. Ashworth Underwood, 2vols., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1953, vol. 1, pp. 489-509.
Probably the best single sourceforunderstanding the elaborate and complex theory ofVan Helmont
is Walter Pagel's, The religious and philosophical aspects ofVan Helmont's science and medicine',
Bull. Hist. Med., 1944, Supplement No. 2. Other general sources are Lester S. King, The road to
medical enlightenment, 1650-1695, London, MacDonald, 1970, pp. 37-62, and Jacques Roger, op.
cit., note 2 above, pp. 98-103.
11 Francis Glisson, Tractatus de ventriculo et intestinis, London, H. Brome, 1677, pp. 147-170.
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Glisson equated his notion of the natural perception to Van Helmont's archeus.
Walter Pagel has demonstrated that their shared conviction that life is immanent in
the matter of the body itself is a monism.12 This is also true of Bordeu's theory. In
each case this is quite different from the dualist systems which treated matter as an
inert substance unless it was acted upon by an immaterial force.
By the mid-eighteenth century, the Glissonian notion ofmatter became formative
in medical and physiological theory. Significantly it provided physiologists with
concepts which enabled them to move beyond the limitations of the mechanist-
animist controversy. By the 1740s that dialectic was becoming strained in any case.
While Glisson saidthattheprocess oforganic activityis dueto anintrinsicirritability,
he wrote that in its first stage it is awakened by a perception which is to say, by a
kind of sensibility. For Bordeu, irritation was a signal which awakened the active
force ofsensibility. Thus the notions ofirritabilty and sensibility can be confused and
in the case of these two physicians, they were practically interchangeable. And so
the terms would remain in the writings of other medical theorists in the eighteenth
century.
In 1747 in his Primae Linae or First Lines of Physiology, Albrecht von Hailer
(1708-1777) discussed the vis insita or a tendency to motion residing in the muscle
of a living body. He wrote that "there resides in the heart a kind of impatience to
stimulus .... Thatmotionispeculiar to theheartitself; comingneitherfromthebrain,
northe soul; seeing it remains in a dead animalevenwhen the heart istorn out ofthe
breast; neither can it, by any act of the will, be made either quicker or slower."1s
The vis insitais "most abundant intheintestines andtheheartboth ofwhichcontinue
to contract long after they have been removed from the body. Itis awidespreadforce
and different muscles are activated by different stimuli such as the bladder by urine,
the heart by blood and so on."14 Finally:
These powers (governed by a vis insita) do not arise from the will; nor are they lessened, or
excited, or suppressed, or changed by the same. No custom nor art can make these organs
subject to the will, which have their motions from a vis insita; nor can it be brought about,
that they should obey the commands ofthe soul, like attendants on voluntary motion. It is so
certain that motion is produced by the body alone, that we cannot even suspect any motion to
arise from a spiritual cause, besides that which we see is occasioned by the will; and, even in
thatmotionwhich isoccasionedbythewill, as stimulus will occasionthegreatestexertions, when
the mind is very unwilling.15
This vis insita was, in fact, a kind ofirritability which functioned much like Glisson's
irritability and Bordeu's sensibility. In Haller's case, however, there was no tendency
to confuse the two forces. Haller's use of "sensibility" was restricted to conscious
sensations. In 1752, the same year that Bordeu's Glandes was published, he read
"WalterPagel,'Harvey andGlisson onirritability with anote onVanHelmont', Bull. Hist. Med.,
1967, 41: 497-514. See also Owsei Temkin, 'The classical roots of Glisson's doctrine ofirritation',
ibid., 1964, 38: 297-328.
Il Albrecht von Haller, First lines ofphysiology, trans. from Latin andprinted underthe inspection
of William Cullen, 2 vols. in 1, reprint of 1786 edition, New York, Johnson Reprint Co., 1966,
vol. 1, pp. 59-60. The emphasis in this passage is Haller's own. 1' Ibid., p. 234.
16 Albrecht von Haller, 'A dissertation on the sensible and irritable parts of animals', London,
1755. A contemporary trans. with intro. by Owsei Temkin, Bull, Hist. Med., 1936, 4: 651-699.
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papers 'On Sensibility' and 'On Irritability' before the Royal Society of Gottingen.
In them he described what he considered the nature of the two forces to be. He
found that the most sensible organs are the least irritable ones. Though Hailer and
Bordeu used the term sensibility in a quite different sense, the quarrelsome Haller
criticized Bordeu's work on Glandes largely because, in his own experiments, he had
not found these organs to possess obvious sensitivity to painful stimuli.
Particularly galling to the pious Hailer was the work of the notorious libertine
Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751) who outraged Europewith l'Hommemachine
which appeared in 1747. With characteristic perversity, he dedicated the work to
Hailer. Its thesis was that neither soul, nor mind, nor special vital forces exist as
unique entities. All the phenomena of the body including those normally attributed
to will or to intelligence are merely consequences of physical organization. The
distinction between inert nature and the living organism is to be found in the pheno-
mena of irritability which La Mettrie conceived of as a general property of living
substance. The work has, in the past, been described as Cartesianphilosophy stripped
ofits soul. In fact, La Mettrie's position was nearer to that of Glisson, Bordeu and
Haller. He removed the rational, conscious soul from matter and extended their
conceptions of active matter to include intellectual and conscious activity. He
summarized his position as follows:
all the faculties ofthe soul depend on the proper organization ofthe brain and ofthe body so
that they arevisibly nothing but organization ... thesoul, therefore, ismerely avain term about
which no one has any idea and for which a good intellect canonly serve to namethepart ofus
whichthinks. Granting the lesserprinciple ofmotion, animatedbodies haveeverything necessary
for them to move, to sense, to think, to be contrite, and in a word, to behave itselfin the
materialbody and in the mental faculties which depend upon it."'
Everything derives from this irritability which is "an innate force ... All the vital,
animal, natural and automatic motions are the result ofthis action.""7
The conceptions of La Mettrie and those ofthe Montpellier vitalists, particularly
Bordeu, were developed in the work ofthe Encyclopedist Denis Diderot (1713-1784).
Though not a physician, Diderot was intrigued with the question of the nature of
life. Over the years he elaborated a materialistic theory oflife designed to answer the
question of how insensible matter comes to be absorbed by the body of an animal
and thus becomes alive and sensible. The solution posedinEntretien entre d'Alembert
et Diderot and Reve de d'Alembert composed in 1769 was very similar to La Mettrie's
solution in l'Homme machine. Diderot said there is a latent force ofsensibility in all
the material in the universe. Among other vitalists, the assumption was that the
properties of life are added on to dead matter and they supersede the inorganic
properties. But Diderot saw life as a condition in which barriers are actually removed
from inorganic matter. He wrote that "from inert matter and given heat and motion,
there results the faculty of sensation, life, memory, consciousness, passion and
thought."18 It was a visionary concept. He thought that life is continually emerging
1" Juhien Offray de la Mettrie, I'Homme machine, ed. by Aram Vartanian, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1960, p. 180. 17 Ibid., pp. 196-197.
1 Denis Diderot Le rive de d'Alembert, in Oeuvres complees, 15 vols., Paris, Le Club Francais,
1969, vol. 8, pp. 67-69.
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from its potential state so that soil, stone, plants and animals form an intricate and
interconnected mass ofcontinually changing matter in which neither birth nor death
have any ultimate meaning.
Without question there is a great distance in time and theory between Van
Helmont's archeus and Diderot's sensibility. Nevertheless both men believed that
life is immanent in the matter of the organized body. As Pagel has pointed out, if
one does not separate the life impulse from organic matter, then the soul or some
other outside force is not required to account for vital activity. That is in contrast to
dualist systems which treat matter as an aggregate of inert particles requiring an
external force to move them and to preserve them from decay ifthey are organized.19
Thus it is that when Bordeu and his colleagues did their work on sensibility, they
were basically replacing the animists' dualist conceptions with monist ones at
Montpellier.
II
In 1772, as ateacher atMontpellier, Barthezpronounced a discourse on the subject
ofthevitalprinciple. He believed thatit was a new and unifying concept which would
revolutionize physiological theory. Six years later, Nouveaux elements de la science
de l'homme expanded on the subject ofthe vital principle. In time Barthez' colleagues
at Montpellier came to agree with his evaluation of the importance ofhis notion so
that his theory ofvitalism eclipsed that of Bordeu and others. It also wiped out the
last vestiges of animism which still remained at Montpellier.
Barthez did not share Bordeu's admiration for Van Helmont whom he described
as "having been involved with meditations approaching deliria." He dismissed
Bordeu'sspecificorganicsensibilities as avainmultiplication ofcausesforthepurpose
ofexplainingthefunctions oflife. Barthezthoughtthatallthefunctions which Bordeu
and others had assigned to a multitude of organic sensibilities could be more accur-
ately attributed to the faculties ofhis single vital principle. He treated it as the cause
of all physiological motion and put it on a par with such physical principles as
attraction and gravitation.20 The vital principle was made up ofsensitive and motor
components and it was assumed to coexist in the body with the rational soul. For the
most part it governed that numerous and complex host oflargely unconscious and
unwilled activity which constitutes the majority of organic phenomena.
For the purpose of this paper, it is significant to note that Barthez considered it
probable that the vital principle has an existence separate from that of the body it
animates. The most important reason for that assumption derived from his view
that matter is fundamentally inert substance. He wrote that "The principle ofmove-
ment and feeling in the living man cannot be understood as a modification of the
body: atleast notifone doesnotreject acceptedideas which give, asessential qualities
of matter, extension which is exclusive of all perception and inertia which prevents
its spontaneous motion however mobile it may be."321 Such a view was incompatible
I' Pagel, op. cit., notes 10 and 12 above.
20 Paul Joseph Barthez, 'Discours pr6liminaire', Nouveaux flJments de la science de l'homme,
Montpellier, J. Martel ain6, 1778, pp. iii-xi.
*1 Ibid., p. 28.
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withthe monist theses ofVan Helmont, Glisson, Bordeu, Haller, La Mettrie, Diderot
and others. In support of his viewpoint, Barthez remarked that the vital principle
canbedestroyed withno apparent alteration oftheintegrity ofthebody. Forexample,
though a drowned man has all his physical parts intact, he can never move again
because the vital principle has either left the body or been destroyed. On the other
hand, the vital principle can survive a long time even with very substantial lesions of
some essential organs like the heart and brain. For such reasons Barthez believed it
likely thatthe cause oflivingfunctions is separatefromthematter ofthe livingbody.22
Itis imposed by aprinciple which maintains life only so long as its linkwiththat body
is not broken. When the inevitable separation finally occurs at death, the body reverts
to an inactive inert mass of matter which becomes subject to dissolution and decay.
Therefore I think it is legitimate to see Barthez as, in certain respects, more akin
theoretically to the dualists than to the monists, even though he rejected the details
ofboth the mechanists' and animists' systems.
Barthez' arguments on behalf of his physiological theory appealed to Newtonian
principles of empiricism and scientific explanation. Barthez lived for a time in Paris
where he was a close friend ofJean d'Alembert who was co-editor ofthe Encyclop6die
and a major exponent ofthe Newtonian philosophy. In the preliminary discourse to
his Nouveaux elements, Barthez alluded to the Newtonian influence in his own work.
The object of natural philosophy, he wrote, is research into the causes of nature.
The observer can only study the succession of phenomena and discern a series of
causes from it. These experimental causes have been variously assigned such in-
determinate labels as Powers, Principles, Forces, Faculties and so on. Barthez was
impressed with astronomy. He thought it had achieved progress because an immense
variety of effects observed in celestial physics had been assigned to a small number
ofexperimental causes. As the science progressed, the number ofexperimental causes
diminished with the establishment of still more general laws to incorporate the suc-
cession ofanalogous phenomena. He speculated that, eventhoughphysicists regarded
magnetism and electricity as two distinct causes, it was probable that in time they
wouldbeunited under athird cause which produces alltheireffects bydifferentmodi-
fications. This searchformoreandmoregeneral causesconstitutedthe essence ofwhat
heconsidered to be "thegoodphilosophic method"(labonnemJthodedePhilosopher).
The ancients had erred in being too apt to multiply causes. Many of Barthez' con-
temporaries, on the other hand, went too far in trying to diminish the number of
causes in natural science below that which observation indicates. This was an error
made by both mechanists and animists. The former tried to reduce complex motor
functions of animals to the single force of communication of motion by impulsion
whichacts ininorganic naturewhilethe lattertried torelate all action toarationalsoul.
Barthez warned his readers against the solidists whose viewpoint was gaining
ground. They were too apt to multiply causes. Its members rejected both the
mechanists' and vitalists' assumptions and some of them appeared to attach great
importance to the ideas of Van Helmont, particularly to his notion that each organ
has its own life in addition to a separate life of the whole body. Barthez dismissed
"Ibid., pp. 27-41.
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archee, the seeds, the sensitive soul and other such concepts as "fictions" and a vain
multiplication of occult causes. Their methods are as imperfect as those of the
mechanists. We recognize, in this discussion, those persons including Bordeu who
made physiology dependent upon sensibility, irritability or some innate force in the
fibres ofthe body.23
Barthez used the word "principle" in general to designate the experimental causes
ofthe phenomena ofmotion. He thought that the motive forces ofnature occupy a
scalefromthemostsimpleprinciples ofmotiontotheprinciples oflifewhichconserve
the organized bodies ofplants and animals. The first and most simple one proper to
matter is impulsion. The force of attraction is more complex and is responsible for
gravity, for the formation of mixed and composite bodies by particular affinities
and for the phenomena ofmagnetism and electricity. Still more complex forces are
involved in the formation ofice crystals, crystalline salts and other angular bodies.
The highest and most complex ofall principles in this hierarchy is the vital principle
ofplants and animals. Itis responsible for livingfunctions which cannot be explained
bythe laws ofstatics, hydraulics orchemistry. Thevitalprinciple varies incomplexity
beginning with plants and terminating with man whose organs are the most perfect
and who is the most intelligent ofall living things.24
So Barthez treated the vital principle as the most general ofexperimental causes.
He assumed that it coexists with the rational soul. The respective functions of the
soul and the vital principle as well and their inter-relationship were the subject of
the Nouveaux e1ments.0
Since Barthez was clearly uneasy with the notion that living activity can reside in
the bodyparts themselves, why did he notchoose the animist solution to the question
oflivingmatter? Likeothervitalists, heconsideredthattheanimistshadaccomplished
averyimportanttaskwhentheydemonstrated theinadequacy ofmechanistphysiolo-
gical principles. Nevertheless, he wrote, the animist notions of the functions of the
soul cannot account for living phenomena. For Barthez the notion of the soul was
inextricably tied to the will and to rationality. The animists had required the soul to
participate in unconscious activity, but Barthez dismissed this pointing out that the
soul has no sense of the body's internal motions. Neither can it modify them. For
example, the motion ofthe heart and arteries cannot be altered by an act ofthe will.
Animists had dealt with this by dividing the soul into various faculties overseeing
different functions. Barthez believed that the soul is a unity (un etre simple) and he
was unwilling so to divide it. The conviction about a united and presumably indi-
visible soul could not reconcile the animists' position to the common observation
that parts separated from the body can often continue to move and to respond to
stimuli. How, for example, can one explain a heart beating after it has been removed
from the body and its association with the soul? Even in a recently decapitated man
there were motions in both the head and the body. What then ofthe soul's govern-
ment? Barthez left it to attend to the rational and conscious functions and assigned
" Ibid., pp. xi-xviii.
" Ibid., pp. 1-6.
" For a good discussion of Barthez' view about the nature of the vital principle, see R6jane
Bernier, 'La notion de principe vitale de Barthez, Archs. Phil., 1975, 35: 423-441.
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the remainder ofthe body's activity to the vital principle.26
The question then was what is the nature and situation ofthat vital principle? If
that extirpated beating heart is not explained in terms of the soul or an organic
sensibility, itremained that someportion ofthe vitalprinciple must reside init. Thus,
since the soul is a unity and indivisible, Barthez had to postulate a divisible vital
principle. Hethoughtthatthevitalprinciple exists in solid andfluidparts ofthe body
alike and that it is endowed with sensitive and motor forces. One must distinguish
between them, he wrote, for they produce entirely different results and exist in very
different proportions of activity in the various organs. He seems to have been in
agreementwith Haller onthatpoint. LikeHailerhepointed outthatthemajor organs
of sensibility are the brain and nerves which possess a very feeble mobility. Unlike
Haller, however, he believed that there is a relationship between the two forces such
that irritability depends on sensibility. Extirpated parts continue to have mobility
because some of the vital principle remains with them and "this part, when these
members are irritated, is caused to move by the sentiment it has of an irritation."27
This assertion took Barthez perilously close to the position of Glisson and Bordeu.
In fact, he wrote ofthe sensibility proper to each organ which exists apart from the
nerves and is particularly clear in the case ofcertain small animals such as shellfish
which have a sensibility though they appear to have no nerves at all. Barthez was
clearly annoyed at a statement ofHailer's in his Elementaphysiologiae in which he
wrote that Barthez had confused irritability with sensibility. He countered with the
charge that Haller's assertion was based on the false assumption that all feeling is
attached to the soul.28 Barthez went on to write about mobility pointing out that it
weakens in proportion tothe solidity ofapart. Insuch structures asbones, the motor
forces exist only to provide nourishment to the parts and to effect regeneration ifthe
bones arebroken. Thefluids ofbody areincontinualmotion as aconsequence ofthis
principle.29 Indeed he argued that it is the action of the vital principle to agitate
solids and fluids which action produces and maintains a suitable degree of heat.80
His assertions about the faculties of sensibility and mobility suggest that Barthez
could easily have been reconciled to the "solidist" arguments which made life imma-
nentinmatter. Nevertheless, helocatedtheseforcesinthevitalprincipleandseparated
them from the matter ofthe body.
Barthez observed that muscular motion is extinguished soon after nervous con-
nexions to it are severed or when the veins and arteries are ligatured. But it is not so
with all organs. Intestinal movements continue for hours after death; a heart re-
moved from an animal retains a strong irritability. It must be, hepostulated, because
these latter organs have a great deal of the vital principle and are less dependent
upon sympathetic connexions with other organs. He tied this alleged quantity of
vital principle to the phenomenon of sleep by reasoning that it is the organs with a
greater proportion ofvitalitywhich require leastrest. Sleep, hethought, is the repose
" Barthez, op. cit., note 20 above, pp. 28-35.
77 Ibid., p. 46.
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'I Ibid., pp. 118-141.
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of muscle movements and it is produced by alterations in the brain which is the
principal centre ofthese forces. But the heart, arteries, respiratory muscles, stomach
and intestines keep up their motion even when the rest of the body is asleep. Since
the continuous activity of these organs is necessary for life, the actionof their vital
principle is stronger."" This speculation about the nature of organs which rest and
those which do not was to be developed further at Montpellier by Grimaud. At the
end of the eighteenth century, Xavier Bichat adopted the distinction and made it
the basis for his division of living functions into animal and organic categories.'8
Barthez wrote at length about sympathies, that is, about the connexions which the
forces ofthevitalprinciplemakebetweenthevarious organsofalivingbody. Because
of its complicated network of sympathies the body is an integrated unit. Some
examples ofsympathies are voice changes in puberty in response to changes in sexual
organs; abscess ofthe liverwhich frequently follows a wound in the head; inflamma-
tionin oneeyewhichproduces the same symptomsinthe other; ifthepupil ofone eye
responds to light, the other will follow suit and so on. Sympathies, Barthez wrote,
travel by way of nervous pathways and there is a perpetual and reciprocal com-
munication ofthe tonic forces of the nerves or a constant antagonism which keeps
these forces in equilibrium.33
These considerations, like those on sensibility and mobility, could just as well
serve asevidence forthe "solidist" position. Afterall, ifthevitalprinciple is variously
distributed through all the parts ofthe body and remains even in an extirpated part,
why not suppose that it is attached to matter itself? As evidence for his conviction
that the vital principle has an existence separate from the body, he offered the pre-
viously mentioned examples ofthe drowned man and the one with the lesions ofthe
heart and brain. He also discussed what he called the "pre-established harmony"
which exists between the vital principle and motions in relation to organs which do
not even exist. For example, a little bird without a mother to imitate will make
flapping motions when its wings are too feeble to support it. A small calf will butt
with non-existent horns. Such examples, Barthez thought, point to the probability
that the vital principle is not a simple modality ofthe living man but has a separate
existence."
Ifthevitalprincipleisseparatefromthematterofthebodybutdistributedthrough-
out all the parts, how does it act? Again Barthez seems to have approached un-
comfortably near to the solidist position in dealing with this question. At one point
he speculated that it must act on the molecules, that is to say, on the smallest parts
of the muscle fibres to disperse them or to bring them together." In this case, it
appears that the only really substantial point which separated Barthez from many
ofhis contemporaries was his allegiance to the assumption that matter by nature is
separate from its motive principle. Therefore life is separate from matter.
Barthez consistently maintained, however, that the nature of the vital principle
Ibid., pp. 227-244.
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could only be a hypothesis. He dismissed the possibility that it might be a substance
intermediate in nature between the material body and the immaterial soul. The
traditional notion of animal spirits was that they have a very fine material nature
and that they use the nerves to effect a connexion between the body and soul. But
Barthez left the question of whether the vital principle might be material. As one
author pointed out, many of Barthez' notions about the vital principle were only
consistent with its being a physical entity.36 He thought, for example, that the vital
principle exists in a latent or concentrated state in pupae, in seeds and in birds'
eggs where it awaits animal heat to form and give life to an organism. He wrote in
various places of lesions of the vital principle and of poisons acting to destroy it.
How can one concentrate, produce lesions in or poison an immaterial principle?
At the end of Nouveaux dlkments, he wrote about death which he defined as the
irrevocable cessation of sensibility and the vital motions. He wrote the following
about the vital principle:
Ifthis Principle is only a faculty united to the living body, it is certain that it perishes with the
body. If it is a being distinct from the body and the soul, it may perish outside the extinction
ofits forces in the bodies which it animates; but it may also pass into other human bodies and
vivify them ... It is possible that the end ofthe vital principle is related to its origin. Thus, in
supposing that it mayhaveemanated from aprinciple which God created to animate theworlds,
it may be rejoined to the Universal Principle at death ... Whatever the destiny of the vital
principle ofman is at death, when his body returns to the earth, his soul returns to God who
gave it to him and who assures him an immortal duration."
With many of his contemporaries Barthez shared a conviction that medicine
needed a unifying principle into which existing knowledge could be fitted and upon
which subsequent observation and experimentation could be based. For him andfor
his successors and students at Montpellier, the vital principle served just such a
purpose. He compared its "discovery" to Newton's discovery ofuniversal gravitation.
Barthez was quite convinced that the vital principle as he described it was unique and
that it distinguished his system from all previous ones. It is not difficult for us to
recognize that Barthez' theory of the vital principle does not belong on the same
ontological plane as Newton's theory ofuniversal gravitation. In fact, Newton would
probablyhavedismissed thevitalprinciple assigning ittotherubbishheap ofscientific
hypotheses. Sixty-five years after Nouveaux clWments first appeared, the naturalist
Georges Cuvier, who claimed profound respect for Barthez, pointed out the difficul-
ties attached to postulating the existence ofthe vital principle. He wrote that gravity
was defined precisely in terms ofits effects and connexions, and the motion ofbodies
towards each other is due to a specific law. The vital principle, on the other hand,
was described only in the most general terms. Cuvier questioned the validity of
postulating this systemwhichwasneithermaterial nor immaterial, neither mechanical
nor intelligent. To say that the phenomena of muscular contraction, sensibility,
curing ofwounds, formation ofthe foetus, reproduction ofthe species are all effects
of a simple, single principle is merely to enumerate phenomena but not to explain
"Bernier, op. cit., note 25 above. 8? Barthez, op. cit., note 20 above, pp. 347-348.
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them.38 Though we must concur with Cuvier's criticisms, it is interesting that most of
them seem not to have occurred to Barthez' contemporaries. It is important not to
losesightoftheintellectual authoritywhich Barthezwieldedespeciallyin Montpellier.
It is significant that in the last quarter ofthe eighteenth century, Barthez was still
searching for a transcendent cause of vital motion. Because of his own particular
understanding ofNewtonian principles, he wanted it to be as universal in its effects
as gravity and aprinciple created by God to animate theworld. Whatever subsequent
evaluations of his work might have been, Barthez believed that he was offering
medicine a completely new concept in the form ofthe vital principle and it was his
conviction that his work would produce a revolution in medical theory as profound
as the earlier revolution had been in physics.
SUMMARY
In 1778 Paul Joseph Barthez, the occupant ofa Chair ofMedicine atthe University
of Montpellier, published a book in which he argued that a living body is a com-
posite ofmatter, a spiritual and rational soul and a vital principle. The latter, he
wrote, governs those physiological functions which are neither willed nor conscious.
The vital principle is distributed throughout all the body parts and it incorporates
the faculties of sensibility and mobility.
Bypostulating suchavitalprinciple, Barthezwasturninghisback on aconsiderable
amount of work which had been done in support of vitalist theory especially since
the mid-eighteenth century. By borrowing ideas from such seventeenth-century
physicians as Jean Baptiste Van Helmont and Francis Glisson, Barthez' fellow physi-
cians articulated theses on behalf of the theory that such forces as sensibility and
irritability or mobility are located in the matter ofthe body itself. Th6ophile Bordeu
and some Montpellier physicians had made physiological activity the function of a
force of sensibility which is located in all the organs and body parts. Albrecht von
Haller had written ofa vis insita which is a kind ofirritability produced by the body
alone. Julien Offray de La Mettrie and Denis Diderot wrote of an irritability and a
sensibility respectively. In all cases, the vital force was considered to be immanent in
the matter ofthe body.
Barthezdidnotaccept thenotionthatmatter could be self-moving so he postulated
a vital principle which was separate from the matter of the body. He thought it
might emanate from a universal principle which God had created to animate the
world. This fundamental difference of opinion about the cause ofliving phenomena
between Barthez and many of his contemporaries sprang from a clash between a
dualist conception whereby nature is divided intomaterial and imnaterial elements
and a monist conception that the ability to move and feel is immanent in matter.
Though we tend to evaluate the latter notion as more progressvie, Barthez' vital
principle captured the allegiance ofmany persons such that today he is still recalled
at Montpellier as the most important and influential of all vitalist theorists.
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